Principles of detection of intentional jamming affecting the equipment of consumers of satellite radio navigation systems

H. K Dao ¹, D. D Stupin ¹, R. A Shevchenko ²

¹ Moscow Institute of physics and technology (national research University) (MIPT), Institutsky lane, 9, Dolgoprudny, Moscow region 141701, Russia

² JSC "RTI", 8 Marta str., 10-1, Moscow 127083, Russia

 

The paper is received on May 14, 2019

 

Abstract. The article considers the impact of intentional jamming on the operation of receivers of satellite navigation systems of aircraft and methods of counteraction to jamming, including:

-                       the classification of intentional jamming affecting the receivers of satellite navigation systems is given: "Energy" jamming – jamming designed to disrupt the operation of the receiver by suppressing a useful information signal and "Simulation" jamming ("Spoofing"-jamming) – jamming simulating signals of navigation satellites, as a result of which the receiver solves the navigation problem with determining the location and motion parameters of the consumer not corresponding to the actual;

-                       the existing methods of formation of "Simulation" ("Spoofing") jamming and algorithms for their detection and neutralize are considered;

-                       the optimal method for solving the problem of combating "Simulation" "Simulation" ("Spoofing") jamming – a method of integrated solution of the navigation problem with its mutual solution according to both satellite navigation systems and inertial navigation system and Autonomous radio systems (DISS, VOR/DME, landing and radio navigation radar).

Key words: satellite radio navigation systems (SRNS), consumer navigation equipment, spoofing jamming.

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For citation:

H. K Dao, D. D Stupin, R. A Shevchenko. Principles of detection of intentional jamming affecting the equipment of consumers of satellite radio navigation systems. Zhurnal Radioelektroniki - Journal of Radio Electronics. 2019. No. 5. Available at http://jre.cplire.ru/jre/may19/14/text.pdf

DOI  10.30898/1684-1719.2019.5.14